Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Song From City Bank Commercial

On Tyranny by Leo Strauss, Natural Right


Metapolítica
articles (for "heat engines" I put an excerpt from a forthcoming article by the Universidad San Pablo in Arequipa after an international event on the Philosophy of Law made this year ) Surely

occasional "Natural Right and History", - "Natural Law and History" - (Strauss, 1971) is perhaps the most widely read text Strauss and the greatest impediment to the problem of natural law in addition also with other relevant articles on issue as it is "On the Natural Law" (Strauss, 1983) and texts that refer to the problem of Jerusalem and Athens to review later (Strauss, 1983), (Strauss, 1989).

In the case of natural law, Strauss draws attention to the meaning of the critique of natural law in the world today and how is it that despite its rejection is inevitable even ask for what is just and good. For example, although the principles of natural law (such as those that appear in the Constitution of the United States) are now regarded more as an ideal than as real, (Strauss, 1971, p.2), these might operate differently in real life. Thus, although we're used to thinking that all positive law is always right, however, the correctness or fairness of such a right should go for consistency with what we would call the principles of law (natural law) therefore, the concept of good endure anyway even if we have been subjected for so long the dogma of positive science and the distinction between facts and values. Even in modern legal theory, it is usual to refer to the so-called "legally protected interest" which provides a basis for the development of positive norms. (Malem, 1998: 73)


Thus the initial concern of Strauss' Natural Right and History ", this time focused on questions raised against the Natural Law from modern thought But Who have become the large natural law enemies?. Undoubtedly, first as already said, science and discourse of neutrality, but secondly appears disastrous for another current development of natural law, historicism, (Strauss, 1983) But the biggest problem is that contempt for natural law leads to nihilism (Strauss, 1971: p.5). Basically, you could say that the critique of natural law with German idealism begins and ends with the radicalization of historicism that appear in the works of authors such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, for example (Smith, 2009: 33)

In this sense, all , seems to begin with the rejection of the teleological view that arose from the ancient natural law, and is ruled entirely by modern science, as pointed out by the former (including Aristotle) \u200b\u200ball natural beings have a natural order, which defined that corresponded thing made to each. As indicated, in the case of men, the reason was what helped to identify these stocks, but when modern science breaks the teleological vision, then it is not possible to speak of natural ends.

So referring to criticism of historicism to natural law, Strauss indicates that it is decanted through the denial of the claim that natural law can be detected by universal reason. If history is a reliable knowledge then history would tell us that such knowledge "does not exist since we can find a myriad of notions of justice or injustice in the world. Thus, "history shows us that all principles of justice are mutable "(Strauss, 1971: p.9)

is clear that the issue of historicism was of great importance in Straussian thought, so we can also find references to other texts in this issue for example in" The Three waves of modernity "(Strauss, 1975), which identifies historicism with the so-called second wave of modernity, one that begins with Rousseau and proceeds to those initiated by Machiavelli and Hobbes (first wave linked to positivism:

" Characteristics of the nation's first wave of modernity were the reduction of morality and politics to a technical problem, and the concept of nature considered by civilization as a mere artifact "(Strauss, 1975: p.89) In contrast, in the second wave of Rousseau, we see that it is opposed to these two characteristics, however, did not try to go back but make its criticism on the basis of these same basis, ie starting from the Hobbesian state of nature, which the had not come back far enough to reach only to the barbaric stage proceeded to the true state of nature, ie pre-human stage, where the hominid was good because was in a pure state, however, change the pre-human state of civilization would not be a work of nature but of history, here lay then the shift proposed by the second wave that radicalized and the project of modernity. (Strauss, 1975: 89 - 90).

In this sense, the variety of conceptions of justice that would outline the preaching of historicism, would suggest so-called non-existence of natural law, Strauss would call such a perspective as a convention. This convention would consider that the distinction between convention and nature is the most important of all distinctions, however, in the context of ancient political philosophy of nature had a superiority of dignity with regard to the convention, but this change with development of historicism that more take to the convention as the idea of \u200b\u200bjustice or right, excluding the nature of this link. (Strauss, 1971: 11).

This relativization of truth that brought historicism, would be in the background as stated above beyond skepticism, believing that the attempt to transform philosophy views on the whole for knowledge about everything, not only is impossible but absurd, because the very idea of \u200b\u200bphilosophy rest on premises that are related (Strauss, 1971: 33)

But what concrete thing we should understand by "natural law"?, Strauss says about it: "The term natural law a law that determines who is right and wrong and who has power, or is it by nature, inherent and, therefore, everywhere and always. Natural law is a higher law "(Strauss, 1983: 137), however, he notes that not every natural law appears as a higher law because in some verses of Sophocles are evocations of a higher law (Divine) is not very natural. But as pointed out by Professor Strauss, "The notion of natural law presupposes the notion of nature" (Strauss, 1983: 137 - 138).

Strauss indicated then that the concept of nature is of Greek origin and there is no reference to it in the biblical world: "The nature was discovered by the Greeks at odds with art (knowledge that leads to the production of artefacts), and above all, the nomos (law, custom, convention, agreement, authoritative opinion). In light of the original meaning of "nature", the notion of "natural law" (nomos physeos TES) is a contradiction in terms "(Strauss, 1983: 138). This contradiction which relates specifically referred to the tension that exist between nature and convention, whereas the conventional take us back to the law - the same which may result in multiple conceptions of justice and hold conventionality - and naturally follow a pre-established order. Thus, rather it could differentiate between "natural law" (natural law) and the most appropriate term would be "natural right" (natural right).

talk of natural law means then think about what is right or correct by itself (according to nature) such as health, courage or intelligence. Certainly the first reflection on natural law as we can find among the Greek philosophers said. For example, while Plato preached on natural law if it refused the convention, saying that there are things that are just by nature (Strauss, 1983: 183) "There is a natural order of the virtues and other good things, this natural order is a measure of the law" (Laws, 631b-d). Aristotle for his part in his rhetoric, talking about "the law according to nature" as the immutable law that is common to all men ", however, in his" Nicomachean Ethics (1134b18-1135a5) is not refers to the natural law but natural law "natural law is the law which has everywhere the same force and not to its validity in any human statement" (Strauss, 1983: 140), one could understand then that the right provides natural minimum conditions for the existence of any community, hence its universal character. Positive law (conventional) if any case would vary depending on the features of the scheme.

The concept of natural law in fact first becomes a philosophical issue with the Stoics whom will not necessarily associated with moral or political, but the physics defined as the science of the universe (Strauss, 1983: 140 ), so the Eternal Law is nothing that the Supreme God, reason, ie, an ordering principle that organizes all matter around it. The important thing with this new reading of natural law is that in reality it is a model is based on the required obedience to authority: "In this application, the natural law directs man towards perfection, the perfection of a rational and social animal, is the guide of life and the teacher of the duties (Cicero about the nature of the gods, I, 40), is the dictate of reason for human life. Thus, the virtuous life, as worthy of being chosen by itself, becomes understood as adherence to natural law: a law, and therefore, as a life of obedience. "(Strauss, 1983: 141 .) So for the Stoic natural law was actually a moral virtue, that is, it was an obligation for everyone to get wise and virtuous - unlike the classical philosophers, while carrying a mandatory connotation. It seems then that there would be a divine providence would intervene to punish any violation of natural law. (Strauss, 1983: 141)

Following the lines of Stoicism, Christianity also develop a conception of natural law that is very close to the Stoic tradition but with certain modifications (eg abandoning materialism) and reaching its greatest development with St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomism in the thirteenth century. In the Christian natural law aspect, the disclosure is in principle a new factor which expresses the same eg the incorporation of the divine law (positive law that is contained in the Bible) that enhances the natural law., in this way, natural law can not be separated as a revealed theology (Strauss, 1971: 163 - 164). There is also the eternal law (God as the beginning of all creatures), which is above the divine and this in turn is above the natural law. All creatures are involved then the divine law. All the precepts of the Decalogue belong then to the natural law, being evident even for the same people (Strauss, 1983: 142), no penalty for breach of natural law but no one knows for sure if you can identify the reason such punishment. Of these ideas, you might think then that the natural law, does not command or forbid anything but merely directs or indicates. With a statement like this would not be surprising that modern natural law thinkers may have been said that even if God did not exist could also be natural law.

modern natural law, and does not understand the concept of nature as this comes from the hand of non-teleological natural science thus destroying the basis of traditional natural law, which will take - as in the case of Hobbes, for example - reject the social or political nature of man or consider for example that human reason is only an instrument of calculation (ratio instrumental) and is no longer able to discover any principles which have already ceased to exist.